Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Art. 78 Motions for Contempt & Oppositions

Court Litigation Documents

Art. 78 Motion for Contempt/Opposition - FUSL000104
(2020-11-03)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_contempt

INDEX NO.

FILED: DUTCHESS COUNTY CLERK 11/03/2020 03:05 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 28

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/03/2020

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
SUPREME COURT
______________________________________________________________________________
In the Matter of

,
Petitioner.
NOTICE OF MOTION

-against-

CPLR ARTICLE 78
Tina M. Stanford, Chair of the
New York State Parole Board,

Index No:
Hon. Christi J. Acker
Respondent.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the purpose of this motion is to punish the parole board
for a contempt of court, and that such punishment may consist of fine or imprisonment, or both.
WARNING TO RESPONDENT: YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT MAY
RESULT IN YOUR IMMEDIATE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT FOR
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
, on the annexed Affirmation/Memorandum of Law, through his
attorney, Kathy Manley of counsel, will move this Court on December 1, 2020 at 9:00 a.m., for
the following relief:
A.

An Order directing Respondent to comply with this Court’s September 17, 2020

Decision and Order which held that in its de novo review the Board must: 1) follow 9 NYCRR
8002.2(a) with regard to departing from the low COMPAS scores; 2) not deny release based
solely on the seriousness of the offense; and 3) not claim, in the absence of support in the record,
that there was a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not live and remain at liberty
without again violating the law;
B.

An Order holding Respondent in Contempt for its failure (in its October 19, 2020

denial of release) to comply with the September 17, 2020 Decision and Order; and
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An Order directing Respondent to reimburse Petitioner for reasonable fees and

costs associated with this motion.
WHEREFORE,

respectfully requests that the Court grant the above

relief, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: November 3, 2020
Kathy Manley
Kathy Manley
Attorney for
26 Dinmore Road
Selkirk, NY 12158
518-635-4005
Mkathy1296@gmail.com
TO:

Clerk, Dutchess County Supreme Court
10 Market Street
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Attorney General of New York State
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Tina M. Stanford,
Chair, NYS Parole Board
Harriman State Campus - Building 2
1220 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12226-2050

(Address on file)
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STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS

In the Matter of

SUPREME COURT

,

Petitioner.

-against-

AFFIRMATION/
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
FOR CONTEMPT ORDER

Tina M. Stanford, Chair of the
New York State Parole Board,

Respondent.

Index No:
Hon. Christi J. Acker

Kathy Manley, duly authorized to practice law in the state of New York, affirms:
1.

Iam the attorney representing Petitioner

, andIam making this

motion for an Order of Contempt because Respondent failed to follow this Court’s Decision and
Order with regard to its denial of release after Mr.

2.

’s de novo hearing.

In Matter ofFerrante v. Stanford , 172 AD3d 31 (2nd Dep’t 2019) the Second

Department upheld an order of contempt under very similar circumstances. In September, 2020,
this Court held that Respondent Parole Board had acted improperly herein by: 1) failing to

identify the COMPAS scale from which it departed, or to identify an individualized reason for
said departure; 2) relying “almost exclusively on the serious nature of Petitioner’s crime and its

perception that his remorse was ‘shallow ’” (a perception not supported by the record); and 3)
because its determination that there was a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not
remain at liberty without violating the law was unsupported by the record. (September 17, 2020
Decision, at 4-7.)

3.

In its October 19, 2020 decision denying release, Respondent made those exact
1
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same legal errors, not even mentioning any need for a departure from the low risk COMPAS
scores; clearly basing the decision on the seriousness of the offense; and claiming again, without
support in the record, that there was a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not remain at
liberty without violating the law. (10/19/20 Parole Board Decision, attached as Exhibit “A.”) As
a result, this Court should hold Respondent in contempt.
THE FACTS
4.

In June, 2019,

(who was sentenced to 25 years to life for

stabbing his former girlfriend to death in 1992) appeared before the Parole Board and was denied
release for the second time.
5.

Mr.

filed an Article 78 Petition in the instant case in March, 2020, and

on September 17, 2020 this Court granted a de novo interview and review. That Decision stated:
“…[T]he Court finds that although the Board indicates that it chose to depart from
the COMPAS, it does not identify the scale from which it departed, nor does it articulate
an individualized reason for such departure, in contravention of 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a).
Instead, the Board indicates, generically, that it is departing from COMPAS and
identifies the reason for the departure is the shallowness of his remorse. Notably, the
COMAS Risk Assessment contains twelve categories, none of which involve an
offender’s lack of remorse. Thus, the purported ‘individualized’ reason provided by the
Board for the departure is unrelated to any scale contained in the COMPAS assessment.
… As the evidence before this Court demonstrates that the Parole Board herein did not
comply with the requirements of 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a), judicial intervention is
warranted…
Although this is basis alone to vacate Respondent’s Decision, the Court finds said
Decision should also be vacated because the Board focused almost exclusively on the
serious nature of Petitioner’s crime and its perception that his remorse was ‘shallow.’
Although the Board is entitled to place more emphasis on the serious nature of
Petitioner’s crime, ‘where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of
the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts
irrationally.’ Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 (2nd Dep’t 2010)… In the instant
matter, although the Board makes passing reference to Plaintiff’s clean discipline and low
COMPAS, it is clear that the Board denied release solely on the basis of the seriousness
of the offense. …
***
Finally, the Board’s finding that there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner
2
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would not live and remain at liberty without again violating the law is unsupported by the
record, and would serve as an additional basis to vacate the June, 2019 Decision. The
record demonstrates that Petitioner was rated the lowest possible score in the categories
of risk of felony violence, arrest risk and abscond risk in his COMPAS assessment, and
had only one disciplinary ticket during his 27-year incarceration.
***
ORDERED that the matter is remitted to Respondent for a de novo parole release
interview and review which complies with all applicable statutes and regulations…”
September 17, 2020 Decision herein, at 4-7, some emphasis supplied.
7.

On October 7, 2020, Petitioner did have a de novo interview1, and on October 19,

2020, Respondent denied release, stating:
“A review of your record, interview and deliberation lead the panel to conclude
that if released at this time there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and
remain at liberty without again violating the law…
Required statutory factors have been considered, together with your institutional
adjustment including discipline and program participation, your risk and needs
assessment and your needs for successful re-entry in the community.
In the instant offense you were convicted of Murder 2nd. You caused the death of
the victim your former girlfriend by cutting her with a knife four times across the neck
and then stabbing her after arguing. …[Y]ou had difficulty expressing why you became
so violent and angry. You stated that you took the knife away from the victim, who was
considerably younger than you. The panel was disturbed by your admission that after you
cut the victim several times you just went home as if nothing happened.
The Bd of Parole commends your personal growth and productive use of time,
however discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct…
The panel acknowledges your parole packet with letters of support, letters of
reasonable assurance and achievements. However, your total disregard for human life is a
concern to the panel. Furthermore, it is evident that you still need to gain insight into your
anger and how it impacts your behavior…” (Exhibit “A” at 1-2)
8.

A review of this Court’s Decision herein along with the above determination

denying release makes it quite clear that Respondent completely failed to comply with this
Court’s Decision and Order. That Decision found three independent reasons for holding that
Respondent had violated the law, and each one alone would have warranted a de novo interview

1

The transcript of that interview has been ordered, but has not yet been received.
3
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and review. First, instead of giving an individualized reason for departing from the low risk
COMPAS scores, and identifying the scale from which it departed, as required by regulation,
Respondent only made passing reference to the risk and needs assessment, and did not even make
any attempt to follow 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a) as directed. That alone is a clear reason for holding
Respondent in contempt. Yet there was more – Respondent again improperly relied solely on the
seriousness of the offense, and again claimed, without support in the record, that there was a
reasonable probability that Petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without again violating
the law. (The conclusory claim that Petitioner still needs “to gain insight into [his] anger” is
completely unsupported by the record.) Those are both additional reasons for holding
Respondent in contempt.
9.

Based on this record, there is absolutely no reason to think that the Parole Board

won’t continue to violate the law, and any and all court orders, in the future, and thus it is
necessary to hold Respondent in contempt.
THE LAW
10.

Courts possess the inherent power to enforce their lawful orders via civil

contempt. McCain v. Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 (1994). There are four elements which must be
satisfied – by clear and convincing evidence - in order for a civil contempt order to be warranted.
McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 (1983). First, the court must determine that there was a
lawful court order expressing a clear mandate; secondly, that such order was disobeyed; third,
that the party in question had knowledge of the order; and fourth, that the disobedience
prejudiced the other party. McCormick, supra, at 583; Matter of Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 AD3d
31, 36 (2nd Dep’t 2019).
11.

This Court made it clear that Respondent had violated the law in three
4
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independent ways (failing to properly depart from the COMPAS scores; relying for denial only
on the seriousness of the offense; and claiming a risk of re-offense which was not supported by
the record) and this was a clear mandate. The October 19, 2020 denial shows, as discussed
above, that Respondent disobeyed that clear mandate. (And the fact that the Parole Board
scheduled the proceeding as a de novo interview shows that Respondent was well aware of this
Court’s Decision.) Respondent’s Decision prejudiced Petitioner, because, while he may not have
a right to release, he has a right to a determination made in accordance with the law.
12.

In Ferrante, the Second Department upheld a finding that the Parole Board was in

contempt when it failed to follow a court decision granting a de novo interview, and where the
denial after said interview suffered from the same infirmities as the determination vacated by the
court. The Ferrante Court stated:
“ ‘Once the movant makes the required showing [for contempt] the burden shifts
to the alleged contemnor to refute that showing, or to offer evidence of a defense such as
an inability to comply with the order’ (Matter of Mendoza-Pautrat v. Razdan, 160 AD3d
963, 964…[2018]…
***
…[T]he [Parole] Board may not deny an inmate parole release based solely on the
seriousness of the offense…
Here, under the unique facts of this particular case, we agree with the Supreme
Court’s exercise of its discretion in granting petitioner’s motion to hold the appellant in
civil contempt for the Board’s failure to comply with the Supreme Court’s judgment
dated October 2, 2015. In the judgment…Supreme Court, after concluding, among other
things, that the Board’s determination to deny parole release was not supported by an
application of the factual record to the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law 259-I,
that the Board’s determination was based exclusively on the severity of the petitioner’s
offense, and that there was no rational support in the record for the Board’s
determination, remitted the matter to the Board ‘to make a de novo determination on
petitioner’s request for parole release’…
…[T]he Board did not appeal from that judgment. Rather, it purported to comply
with the judgment by rendering a new determination following a de novo interview
before a different panel and, in its written decision and in the transcript of the interview,
purported to comply with its responsibilities to consider the requisite statutory factors.
However, the Supreme Court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, decided that the
Board again denied parole release exclusively on the basis of the underlying conviction
5
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without giving consideration to the statutory factors. Consequently, the Supreme Court
held that a finding of civil contempt was warranted.
Mindful that ‘[e]very contempt application must be decided on the basis of its
own unique facts and circumstances’ (Matter of Banks v. Stanford, 159 AD3d 134, 146)
we agree with the Supreme Court that a finding of civil contempt was warranted on the
facts of this case. Even though the Board purported to comply with its responsibilities to
consider the requisite statutory factors, we agree with Supreme Court’s conclusion, made
after a hearing, that the record in this case demonstrates that the Board again denied
parole release exclusively on the basis of the underlying conviction without giving
consideration to the statutory factors. …
In all, the petitioner established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Board
was aware of the judgment dated October 2, 2015; that the judgment was a lawful and
unequivocal mandate of the court; that the Board, by failing to give consideration to the
requisite statutory factors set forth in Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A), disobeyed that
mandate; and that prejudice to the petitioner resulted. The appellant failed to meet her
burden of rebutting the evidence establishing the elements of civil contempt.” Ferrante,
supra, at 36-39, emphasis supplied.
13.

While the Second Department noted that the Ferrante holding was limited to its

facts, it is submitted that is because, as pointed out therein, at 38, “every contempt application
must be decided on the basis of its own unique facts and circumstances.” (emphasis supplied)
14.

The facts in Ferrante show that the Parole Board violated the court mandate in

essentially one way – by relying exclusively on the seriousness of the offense to deny release.
The facts in the instant case show that the Parole Board violated this Court’s lawful mandate in
three different ways: 1) by completely refusing to follow 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a) with regard to
departing from the low COMPAS scores despite a direction to follow all applicable laws and
regulations; 2) by, as in Ferrante, denying release based on the seriousness of the offense in
contravention to this Court’s mandate; and 3) by claiming, in a conclusory manner without
support from the record (and contrary to the COMPAS findings) that there was a reasonable
probability that Petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without again violating the law.
15.

Thus, as in Ferrante, the requisite criteria for civil contempt have been met – this

Court’s Decision and Order was an unequivocal lawful mandate; Respondent had knowledge of
6
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it and violated it; and Petitioner was prejudiced as a result. If this Court agrees that any one of
the above three violations has been established by the record herein, the burden should shift to
Respondent to rebut this showing at a hearing.
CONCLUSION
16.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: 1) direct

Respondent to hold a new de novo hearing to be held within 30 days2 before a board with no
members on either of the previous two boards - and again specifically direct that Respondent
follow this Court’s September 17, 2020 Decision and Order; 2) (after giving Respondent an
opportunity to rebut the showing of contempt) hold Respondent in civil contempt until such time
as a proper interview and review have been held; and 3) award reasonable costs and fees
associated with the instant motion, as occurred in Ferrante, supra.
Dated: November 3, 2020.
Kathy Manley
Kathy Manley
Attorney for
26 Dinmore Road
Selkirk, NY 12158
518-635-4005
Mkathy1296@gmail.com

It is noted that Petitioner’s regular parole interview is currently scheduled for December, 2020. If there is no
decision on the contempt motion before that time, as seems likely, it is anticipated that Petitioner will postpone his
interview for a month or two until there is a decision herein. If this Court holds Respondent in contempt until a
proper interview and review are conducted, it seems that the postponed regular interview could instead constitute the
required de novo interview, as occurred in Matter of Bottom v. Stanford, Index No. E2020-745 (Sullivan Co. 2020.)
7
2
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